Imperfectivity, understood as a semantic notion, expresses the idea that an event or habit is ongoing. A sentence like (1) exemplifies the so-called continuous reading. It says that at the time of utterance there is an ongoing event of Mary dying her hair. A sentence like (2) exemplifies the so-called habitual reading. It says that at the time of utterance, Mary is in the habit of dying her hair.
As I said above, determiners in the nominal domain are sensitive to number of the predicates they combine with. I claim that the same is true with Imp. We predict the existence of three types of Imp: (i) Imp sg : combines only with singular VPs; (ii) Imp pl : combines only with plural VPs; (iii) Imp N : combines with both types of VP. I argue that English and Romance provide us with instantiations of all three kinds. Here is a non-exhaustive list: Simple Present sentences in Italian, French, and Spanish give rise to both continuous and habitual readings. I assume they all involve Imp N . Imp N is like the determiner some in English (some boy/some boys); Simple Present sentences in English and Portuguese only have habitual readings. I assume they involve Imp pl . Imp pl is like the determiner alcuni in Italian (Chierchia (1998) )(alcuni uomini/*alcuno uomo) or the determiner many in English; Progressive sentences in Italian and Spanish only give rise to continuous readings. I assume they involve Imp sg . Imp sg is like the determiner every in English (every boy/*every boys). The analysis thus provides a simple and elegant account of crosslinguistic variation within the domain of imperfectivity, reducing the differences to a single parameter related to the 'number' requirements of a (existential) determiner. Modal ingredients: Having shown how we can unify the temporal semantics of continuous and habitual readings of imperfective sentences, I argue that they also involve the same modal semantics. I will focus on two facts that have been discussed in connection with progressive sentences: (i) that a sentence like 'Mary was crossing the street, when a bus hit her' can be true, even if Mary never managed to cross the street. (ii) that a sentence like 'Mary is crossing the Atlantic' is false, if Mary is a normal human being (Landman (1992) ). These facts can be accounted for if one adopts a modal analysis according to which the events in question are asserted to exist only in worlds which share certain circumstances (including Mary's physical and mental states) with the actual world, but in which all external obstacles are removed. (Dowty (1977) ; Bonomi (1997) ; Portner (1998) ) (i) is true because in these worlds, no buses, or cars, or anything hits Mary, and she can safely cross the street; (ii) is false because Mary's physical conditions make it impossible for her to cross an ocean, even if we remove external obstacles (shark attacks, big waves, etc). I show that exactly the same kind of modality can be coupled with what I suggested above for habituals to give us the right meaning of the sentences. Thus, 'Mary used to dye her hair, when she got hit by a bus and died' can be true if Mary had already dyed her hair at least once before, despite the fact that she would never do it again after the accident. In this case, what prevented the existence of a sequence of intervals at which Mary dyes her hair that includes the time of her death is an external obstacle that gets removed in the worlds being quantified over. That is why the sentence can be true. Now, consider the sentence 'Mary (herself) dyes her hair'. It is false if Mary used to dye her hair, but due to a recent accident, she cannot control the movements of her hands anymore. As in the Atlantic case, it is an 'internal' limitation that is at stake here, preventing the existence of a sequence of events of Mary dying her hair that includes the utterance time. That is why the sentence is judged false. These parallels strengths the motivation for a unified semantics of continuous and habitual readings. That is exactly what the analysis that I propose here delivers.
